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H E A L T H & M E D I C I N E 
Recommended levels of anti­tobacco spending
 
have little effect on cigarette use.
 
Is the CDC
 
Blowing Smoke?
 
n 2007, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (
to the report, “Research shows 
control programs. According 
mendations for state tobacco 
practice” 
released a report detailing “best I cdc) spending recom­
that the more states spend on compre­
hensive tobacco control programs, the 
greater the reductions in smoking — and 
the longer states invest in such programs, 
the greater and faster the impact.” 
The cdc spending guidelines use 
research to form “best practice” spend­
ing recommendations for each state. The 
report claims: 
Implementing a comprehensive 
tobacco control program structure 
at the cdc­recommended levels of 
investment would have a substan­
tial impact. For example, if each 
state sustained its recommended 
level of funding for 5 years, an esti­
mated 5 million fewer people in 
this country would smoke. As a 
result, hundreds of thousands of 
premature tobacco­related deaths 
would be prevented. Longer­term 
investments would have even 
greater effects. 
This claim should be met with skep­
Michael L. Marlow is professor of economics in the 
Orfalea College of Business at California Polytechnic 
State University. 
BY MICHAEL L. MARLOW 
California Polytechnic State University 
ticism. At least four reasons suggest that 
benefits from meeting spending targets 
are not as large as the cdc argues: 
■ The cdc recommendations draw 
heavily on research from just two 
states: California and 
Massachusetts. Those two states 
are considered models of effec­
tive programs, in part, because 
they have the longest funding 
histories. Even if highly effective, 
their success may not be easily 
exported to other states. 
■ The cdc ignores studies that
 
show little to no impact from
 
tobacco control programs.
 
■ There is evidence, again ignored 
by the cdc, that little to no con­
nection exists between state 
spending on tobacco control and 
the degree to which residents 
smoke. 
■ The cdc offers no empirical ver­
ification that implementing rec­
ommended spending targets 
causes significant reductions in 
tobacco use. 
This article focuses on the last point 
above. Empirical investigation of the 
connection between spending guidelines 
and tobacco use is conducted to direct­
ly assess whether states that are closer to 
cdc guidelines actually exhibit lower 
tobacco sales than states that do not. 
Analysis focuses on two related issues. 
One is the fundamental question of 
whether tobacco sales over 2000–2007 
were influenced by spending on tobacco 
control. The other is the policy ques­
tion of whether meeting cdc spending 
targets matters in efforts to reduce 
tobacco sales. 
TOBACCO CONTROL 
L I T E R AT U R E 
Studies of tobacco control programs 
often focus on California and Massa­
chusetts because of their long funding 
histories. Tobacco control in California 
began in 1988 when voters approved the 
California Tobacco Tax and Health Pro­
motion Act of 1988 (Proposition 99), 
which increased the state surtax on cig­
arettes by 25 cents per pack and ear­
marked revenues for tobacco control pro­
grams. In 1992, a Massachusetts ballot 
initiative raised taxes 25 cents per pack, 
with the resulting revenue to be used for 
creation of the Massachusetts Tobacco 
Control Program. 
Some empirical studies have indicat­
ed that the programs do indeed reduce 
smoking. However, the studies’ reliabil­
ity is unclear. A 2003 Journal of Health Eco­
nomics paper by Matthew Farrelly et al. 
points out that most studies simply per­
form trend analysis on the introduction 
of new tobacco control programs and 
ignore other factors that might influ­
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ence tobacco consumption. Those stud­
ies also focus heavily on California or 
Massachusetts. Even if their conclusions 
are valid — that tobacco control pro­
grams cause less smoking — it remains 
unclear whether extrapolation to other 
states is appropriate. 
Early studies that control for one or 
more factors outside of tobacco control 
programs uniformly show that the pro­
grams are highly effective in lowering 
tobacco use. A 1995 American Economic 
Review paper by T.­W. Hu et al. controlled 
for state excise taxes and tobacco firm 
media expenditures and found that state 
spending lowered consumption in Cal­
ifornia. A 1995 Journal of Public Health 
paper also by Hu et al. estimated that a 
25 cent state tax hike reduced taxed sales 
in California when measured over about 
two years. Those two studies controlled 
for effects of time on cigarette con­
sumption, which may control for various 
other factors — such as greater health 
concerns — that affect smoking over 
time. However, the Hu team’s studies 
focus on California, the longest­lived 
state program, and examine effects on 
taxed sales over very few and very early 
years of a program that began in 1988. 
The Farrelly paper examined tobac­
co control activities of all 50 states and 
concluded that state tobacco control 
expenditures lowered taxed cigarette 
sales over 1981–2000, after controlling 
for excise taxes, smuggling, time, and 
other state­specific factors. They also 
estimated that aggregate cigarette sales 
would have fallen by an additional 9 
percent by 2000 if states had spent at 
minimum funding levels advocated by 
the cdc. A 2005 American Journal of 
Public Health paper by John Tauras et al. 
concluded that spending in the 50 
states lowered youth smoking preva­
lence and the number of cigarettes 
smoked over 1991–2000, after control­
ling for other factors that might also 
influence sales. 
The studies discussed so far exam­
ined years in which many states did not 
actively fund programs. The cdc only 
began publishing funding data in 2000 
because many states did not actively 
fund programs until after the Master 
Settlement Agreement in 1998. It 
remains unclear whether the experience 
of tobacco control programs prior to 
when most states actively began funding 
the programs easily translates into rec­
ommendations for many states that only 
began funding around 2000. It is also 
unclear if experiences in the few states 
with relatively long funding histories 
easily convey to the many states without 
such histories. 
BEST PRACTICES 
SPENDING TARGETS 
The cdc’s 2007 “best practices” report 
claims that a range of $15 to $20 per capi­
ta is a reasonable annual target for each 
state to fund tobacco control activities. 
Appropriate activities include anti­smok­
ing ads, cessation interventions (inten­
sive counseling services and cessation 
medications), and enforcement of age 
restrictions on the purchase of tobacco. 
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T a b l e 1 
Keeping Up With the CDC? 
Annual state spending on tobacco 
control for 2000–2007 as percentages 
of cdc minimums 
Average 
(percent) 
Minimum 
(percent) 
Maximum 
(percent) 
Alabama 7 1 22 
Alaska 48 17 77 
Arizona 96 66 132 
Arkansas 82 0 103 
California 57 45 82 
Colorado 54 16 110 
Connecticut 5 0 19 
Delaware 56 0 119 
Florida 26 1 56 
Georgia 30 5 49 
Hawaii 77 39 95 
Idaho 11 5 17 
Illinois 30 13 71 
Indiana 64 31 101 
Iowa 36 26 49 
Kansas 4 3 6 
Kentucky 15 9 23 
Louisiana 25 2 42 
Maine 139 123 168 
Maryland 67 30 99 
Massachusetts 56 7 136 
Michigan 0 0 0 
Minnesota 94 65 122 
Mississippi 108 0 165 
Missouri 0 0 0 
Montana 35 4 74 
Nebraska 35 3 53 
Nevada 30 22 33 
NewHampshire 14 0 28 
New Jersey 42 23 67 
New Mexico 35 16 56 
New York 45 31 89 
North Carolina 19 0 40 
North Dakota 27 0 38 
Ohio 73 35 97 
Oklahoma 25 8 46 
Oregon 31 14 53 
Pennsylvania 49 0 80 
Rhode Island 25 10 33 
South Carolina 5 0 8 
South Dakota 15 8 31 
Tennessee 0 0 0 
Texas 9 5 12 
Utah 44 39 47 
Vermont 68 57 82 
Virginia 40 32 57 
Washington 68 45 82 
West Virginia 41 38 42 
Wisconsin 45 32 68 
Wyoming 41 12 80 
Source: Campaign for Tobacco­Free Kids, “History of State 
Spending for Tobacco Prevention,” 2008. 
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Table 1 displays how state spending 
on tobacco control over 2000–2007 com­
pared to cdc­recommended minimum 
levels. Percentages of cdc­minimum lev­
els are shown. Two states — Maine and 
Mississippi — averaged over 100 percent 
over this period, and three states — 
Michigan, Missouri, and Tennessee — 
spent nothing. Table 2 displays total 
spending in years 2000–2007 as well as 
average percentages of cdc minimums 
in each of those years. Total spending (in 
2005 dollars) has been declining since 
2003, and percent of cdc minimums 
has ranged between 33.6 percent and 
46.9 percent. Aggregate spending is $5.3 
billion, which is roughly $18 per capita. 
The cdc is thus arguing that states 
should have spent at least $8 billion 
more during those years, for a total of 
$13.3 billion, to meet minimum recom­
mended levels of funding. That works 
out to roughly $44.30 per capita over 
those years. The summary measures 
appear to indicate ample variation with 
which to assess cdc claims that consis­
tent meeting of recommended spend­
ing targets over time leads to significant 
reduction in tobacco use. 
As mentioned previously, the cdc 
stresses the importance of maintaining 
state funding over time at levels that 
meet or exceed minimum targets. This 
suggests that it takes many years of 
tobacco control activity before full 
effects of programs can be detected. 
Spending is hypothesized to act as adver­
tising: successful campaigns (in this case) 
reduce demand both today and tomor­
row. The Hu et al. American Economic 
Review paper, the Farrelly et al. Journal of 
Health Economics paper, and my 2006 
Cato Journal paper each found some evi­
dence that cumulative measures of 
spending that discounted past spend­
ing on tobacco control were associated 
with less tobacco use. 
This article employs discount rates 
of 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent in its analy­
sis of the effectiveness of the cdc rec­
ommendations. This article also con­
siders a cumulative measure of funding 
adequacy as defined by how closely states 
have met spending recommendations 
over time. Table 3 displays cumulative 
measures of tobacco control spending 
(in 2005 dollars) per capita. Values are 
T a b l e 2 
National Totals 
Annual state tobacco control spending 
Total Spending 
($2005) 
Percent of CDC 
Minimum 
2000 $771.3M 42.5 
2001 813.1M 46.1 
2002 814.0M 46.9 
2003 715.9M 42.1 
2004 561.3M 33.9 
2005 538.2M 33.6 
2006 533.9M 34.4 
2007 562.6M 37.2 
Source: Campaign for Tobacco­Free Kids, “History of State 
Spending for Tobacco Prevention,” 2008. 
shown for 2007, and so values over 
2000–2006 are included at discounted 
rates. Average values are $19.53 and 
$11.68 for discount rates of 5 and 20 
percent, respectively. Table 4 displays 
cumulative measures of funding ade­
quacy, as defined as percentage of cdc 
minimum spending targets, at discount 
rates of 5 and 20 percent. Average values 
are 274 percent and 167 percent for dis­
count rates of 5 and 20 percent, respec­
tively. Cumulative measures of funding 
levels and adequacy thus range widely 
across states throughout the period. 
MODELING EFFECTS OF 
TOBACCO CONTROL 
Taxed sales of cigarettes are estimated 
using a pooled and balanced regression 
model over 2000–2007. A fixed effects 
model is estimated to control for state­
specific factors outside of the model. 
Total sample size is 400 observations 
and represents all states across the eight­
year time period. The following rela­
tionship for taxed cigarette sales is esti­
mated: 
CIGit = f(PRICEit , PCYit , UEit , BANit , 
SMUGit , CONTROLit) 
The subscript i refers to the 50 states 
and t refers to years 2000 to 2007. The 
dependent variable CIGit is the number 
of tax­paid per­capita cigarette sales (in 
packs) and is obtained from William 
Orzechowski and Robert Walker’s 2008 
monograph The Tax Burden of Tobacco. 
The log of CIGit is examined, as is com­
monly done, and allows direct estima­
tion of the price elasticity of demand 
because the log of the price variable is 
included on the right­hand side of the 
equation. PRICEit is the price (in 2005 
dollars) of a pack of cigarettes, as report­
ed by Orzechowski and Walker, and is 
hypothesized to be inversely related to 
cigarette consumption. 
Real per­capita personal income PCYit 
is obtained from U.S. Department of 
Commerce data. The sign on PCYit is 
ambiguous because, while cigarette 
demand may be income­elastic and there­
fore exhibit a positive sign, higher income 
may also lower sales given common per­
ceptions that higher­income individuals 
smoke less. Unemployment level UEit 
controls for the state of the economy 
and its sign is ambiguous as well because 
it is unclear if high unemployment is 
associated with more smoking from 
greater emotional distress or less smok­
ing from greater financial distress. 
The smoking ban variable BANit con­
trols for the effect of state­wide smoking 
bans in restaurants. Values of BANit are 
set to 0 prior to bans and 1 thereafter to 
capture effects on taxed sales. Data on 
bans are obtained from a 2008 publica­
tion by the group Americans for Non­
smokers Rights. Some researchers have 
found that smoking restrictions lead to 
less smoking, which suggests that its 
sign will be negative. 
Tax­paid cigarette sales do not fully 
ref lect in­state consumption when 
smokers purchase some portion of cig­
arettes across state borders. SMUGit is 
defined as the ratio of the own­state 
price to the average for bordering states 
and is hypothesized to be inversely relat­
ed to taxed sales because higher values 
indicate higher incentives for cross­bor­
der smuggling. Values for Hawaii and 
Alaska are set to 1 because they do not 
border other states and so their smokers 
are assumed to not purchase from other 
states. Data are obtained from Orze­
chowski and Walker (2008). 
CONTROLit measures tobacco con­
trol spending and is measured in two 
alternative ways. The first measure is 
spending (again, in 2005 dollars) per 
capita (SPENDINGit) and the second is as 
a percentage of cdc minimums (ADE­
QUACYit). As discussed above, SPEND­
T a b l e 4T a b l e 3 
CDC Recommendations Per­Capita Spending 
Discounted cumulative per­capita and Total Spending 
tobacco control spending, in 2005 dollars Discounted cumulative measures of 
funding adequacy as a percentage of 
cdc minimum targets 
Discount rates Percent of CDC recommendation 
5% 20% 5% discount rate 20% discount rate 
Alabama $ 2.69 $ 1.08 Alabama 41 17 
Alaska $ 41.36 $ 28.41 Alaska 335 236 
Arizona $ 32.57 $ 18.37 Arizona 637 378 
Arkansas $ 37.66 $ 24.02 Arkansas 566 369 
California $ 18.43 $ 10.57 California 379 224 
Colorado $ 20.20 $ 13.58 Colorado 376 263 
Connecticut $ 2.14 $ 1.13 Connecticut 33 18 
Delaware $ 42.04 $ 33.18 Delaware 418 333 
Florida $ 8.21 $ 3.43 Florida 159 68 
Georgia $ 9.89 $ 4.85 Georgia 190 96 
Hawaii $ 46.11 $ 27.41 Hawaii 514 315 
Idaho $ 6.12 $ 3.51 Idaho 74 44 
Illinois $ 10.60 $ 5.27 Illinois 193 98 
Indiana $ 24.47 $ 12.16 Indiana 408 208 
Iowa $ 16.23 $ 9.13 Iowa 236 137 
Kansas $ 1.70 $ 1.14 Kansas 25 17 
Kentucky $ 6.27 $ 3.28 Kentucky 98 53 
Louisiana $ 11.00 $ 7.40 Louisiana 176 120 
Maine $ 82.67 $ 48.32 Maine 924 555 
Maryland $ 25.40 $ 13.58 Maryland 435 240 
Massachusetts $ 20.44 $ 8.86 Massachusetts 342 151 
Michigan $ 0 $ 0 Michigan 0 0 
Minnesota $ 36.44 $ 20.29 Minnesota 615 353 
Mississippi $ 48.04 $ 24.66 Mississippi 694 364 
Missouri $ 0 $ 0 Missouri 0 0 
Montana $ 25.27 $ 17.94 Montana 251 183 
Nebraska $ 18.30 $ 9.45 Nebraska 225 120 
Nevada $ 12.26 $ 7.27 Nevada 202 126 
New Hampshire $ 7.85 $ 3.12 New Hampshire 83 33 
New Jersey $ 15.22 $ 8.00 New Jersey 274 148 
New Mexico $ 17.85 $ 11.96 New Mexico 244 168 
New York $ 15.91 $ 10.76 New York 314 217 
North Carolina $ 6.68 $ 5.20 North Carolina 139 110 
North Dakota $ 24.38 $ 17.10 North Dakota 189 134 
Ohio $ 27.27 $ 16.38 Ohio 487 300 
Oklahoma $ 10.71 $ 7.24 Oklahoma 171 119 
Oregon $ 12.69 $ 6.46 Oregon 200 105 
Pennsylvania $ 18.37 $ 12.04 Pennsylvania 340 226 
Rhode Island $ 15.77 $ 8.80 Rhode Island 162 92 
South Carolina $ 1.89 $ 1.01 South Carolina 31 18 
South Dakota $ 11.68 $ 6.15 South Dakota 98 53 
Tennessee $ 0 $ 0 Tennessee 0 0 
Texas $ 2.73 $ 1.50 Texas 56 32 
Utah $ 19.32 $ 11.74 Utah 300 190 
Vermont $ 60.19 $ 35.05 Vermont 451 269 
Virginia $ 14.52 $ 8.49 Virginia 267 160 
Washington $ 25.74 $ 16.51 Washington 469 310 
West Virginia $ 22.50 $ 13.49 West Virginia 276 169 
Wisconsin $ 17.72 $ 9.51 Wisconsin 295 163 
Wyoming $ 42.99 $ 31.79 Wyoming 297 224 
Sources: Campaign for Tobacco­Free Kids, “History of State Spending for Tobacco Prevention,” 2008; author’s calculations 
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INGit is commonly used in the literature T a b l e 5 and ADEQUACYit measures cdc­defined 
funding adequacy. Data are obtained 
CDC Recommendations and Cigarette Sales from a 2008 publication by the group 
Effects of spending and funding adequacy on the log of cigarette sales, with and 
Campaign for Tobacco­Free Kids. Cumu­without instrumental variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instrument for Instrument for 
Spending Adequacy 
Real price per pack (PRICE ) **­0.8430*** **­0.8430*** **­0.8205*** **­0.8205*** 
(10.35) (10.35) (9.84) (9.84) 
Per­capita income (PCY ) **­3.2E­05*** **­2.9E­05*** **­3.22E­05*** **­2.93E­05*** 
(7.64) (6.37) (7.56) (6.37) 
Unemployment (UE ) 0.0037 0.0011 0.0029 ­0.0011 
(0.48) (0.14) (0.39) (0.14) 
State­wide smoking ­0.0198 ­0.0249 ­0.0238 ­0.0249 
ban in restaurants (BAN ) (1.12) (1.38) (1.34) (1.38) 
Ratio of in­state price to ­0.1863 *­0.2148* *­0.2286* *­0.2148* 
border states’ prices (SMUG ) (1.51) (1.70) (1.84) (1.70) 
Real per­capita spending on ***0.011495*** 0.02778** 
tobacco control (SPENDING ) (4.72) (2.17) 
Tobacco control spending ***0.0008*** **0.0022** 
as percentage of CDC 3.98 2.17 
minimums (ADEQUACY ) 
Constant ***10.39062*** ***10.14091*** ***10.3865*** ***10.1327*** 
(26.71) (24.82) (26.78) (24.74) 
R­squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Mean dependent variable 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26 
S.E. of regression 0.0805 0.0825 0.0812 0.0825 
F­statistic 146.07 138.75 143.40 138.75 
Observations 400 400 400 400 
lative measures of these variables are 
also examined to test whether differ­
ences in funding levels exert lagged 
effects on tobacco use over time and 
across states. 
If states with relatively few smokers 
display less tolerance for smoking and 
therefore spend more on tobacco control, 
my econometric estimates of the effect of 
tobacco control spending will be inac­
curate. Instrumental variable estimation 
is one method of dealing with this endo­
geneity problem and involves selection of 
a new variable that is both highly corre­
lated with the independent variable in 
question (tobacco control spending) and 
also uncorrelated with all the other caus­
es of smoking. Real state per­capita 
tobacco settlement funds MSAit are used 
as an instrument for SPENDINGit and 
ADEQUACYit because those funds should 
influence funding availability, but it is 
unlikely that those funds independent­
NOTES: *** significant 1% level (two­tailed test); ** significant at 5 level; * significant as 10 percent level; t­statistics in parentheses 
ly influence cigarette sales. (As a check for 
whether MSAit is a weak instrument, we 
T a b l e 6 can determine whether the F­statistic 
exceeds 10 when testing the hypothesis 
Cumulative Tobacco Control Spending and Cigarette Sales that coefficients on all instruments are 
Effects of cumulative control spending on cigarette sales with zero. In this case, the F­statistic for 
instrumental variable for spending SPENDINGit was 18.1, and for ADEQUA­
(1) (2) (3) (4) CYit was 19.50, indicating that MSAit is a 
good instrument.) Settlement revenues Real price per pack (PRICE ) ****­0.8241*** **­0.8286*** **­0.8347*** **­0.8420*** 
(9.76) (9.79) (9.83) (9.89) were based on a formula that included 
Per­capita income (PCY ) ****­3.41E­05*** **­3.48E­05*** **­3.56E­05*** **­3.62E­05*** smoking­attributable state Medicaid 
(6.45) (6.67) (6.93) (7.19) 
expenses and, while the agreement did 
Unemployment (UE ) ­0.0017 ­0.0024 ­0.0032 ­0.0040 
not dictate how funds were to be allo­(0.21) (0.29) (0.40) (0.50) 
cated, tobacco control advocates argued State­wide smoking ­0.0289 ­0.0296 ­0.0302 *­0.0306* 
ban in restaurants (BAN ) (1.57) (1.61) (1.65) (1.68) that states should use those funds to sig­
Ratio of in­state price to *­0.2244* *­0.2269* *­0.2268* *­0.2248* nificantly expand tobacco control spend­
border states’ prices (SMUG ) (1.76) (1.78) (1.78) (1.77) 
ing. Evidence, however, indicates that 
Discount Rate those funds often go toward closing state 
5% 10% 15% 20% government deficits and costs associated 
with general health care programs. Real per­capita spending on 0.0004 0.0008 0.0014 0.0022 
tobacco control (SPENDING ) (0.50) (0.79) (1.11) (1.44) Tobacco settlement data are obtained 
Constant ***10.4208*** ***10.4727*** ***10.5321*** ***10.5940*** from Orzechowski and Walker’s book. 
(23.99) (24.00) (24.06) (24.17) 
R­squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 
Mean dependent variable 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26 
SPENDING AND ADEQUACY 
S.E. of regression 0.0830 0.0830 0.0829 0.0815 
Table 5 displays estimates of tobacco F­statistic 136.90 137.05 137.30 137.65 
control spending on cigarette sales. Observations 400 400 400 400 
Columns (1) and (2) display estimations 
NOTES: *** significant 1% level (two­tailed test); ** significant at 5 level; * significant at 10 percent level; t­statistics in parentheses 
with and without instruments for tobac­
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co control spending, and columns (3) 
and (4) display estimations with and 
without instruments for adequacy. Price 
coefficients, which measure price elas­ Cumulative Spending, CDC Recommendations, 
ticities, lie between ­0.82 and ­0.84 and and Cigarette Sales 
are in line with the expectation that 
demand for cigarettes is price inelastic. 
Per­capita income is found to exert neg­
ative and significant influences on sales. 
Unemployment and smoking ban vari­
ables do not exert significant effects. Per­capita income (PCY ) 
Smuggling is found to exert the hypoth­
esized negative effect on sales in all esti­
mations except in column (1). Coeffi­
cients on both measures of tobacco ban in restaurants (BAN ) 
control spending are all positive and sig­ Ratio of in­state price to 
nificant. Positive coefficients run count­
er to cdc arguments that sales fall with 
higher spending. The implication is that 
higher contemporaneous spending rais­
es cigarette sales, and this result is found as percentage of CDC 
for estimations with and without instru­
mental variables. 
At least two possibilities might 
explain positive coefficients on spending 
and adequacy measures: 
■ A “James Dean” effect might 
exist whereby spending on tobac­
co control raises social taboos NOTES: *** significant 1% level (two­tailed test); ** significant at 5 level; * significant at 10 percent level; t­statistics in parentheses 
against smoking and then (per­
versely) causes more smoking. 
There is some evidence that this 
happens with younger smokers 
following the introduction of 
smoking bans. 
■ More likely, specification error 
may exist when effects of spend­
ing on sales are longer­lived than 
the contemporaneous relation in 
Table 5. Tables 6 and 7 show 
that cumulative effects of spend­
ing and adequacy on sales are 
estimated to be either negative 
or zero, and so positive coeffi­
cients in Table 5 are likely the 
result of specification error. 
It is also apparent that t­values asso­ nificant effects on sales in all estima­ percent. 
ciated with spending and adequacy coef­ tions. Again, evidence does not support It is also worth noting that the effects 
ficients are lower in instrumental value cdc claims that states that spend more of funding adequacy discounted at a 5 
estimations. This commonly occurs will also have less tobacco use. percent rate are statistically significant at 
because standard errors are biased down­ Table 7 displays estimations based the 95 percent confidence level, and at 
ward in ordinary least squares estima­ on measures of cumulative spending the 90 percent confidence level when 
tions when endogeneity is present. This adequacy. Effects from price, income, funding adequacy is discounted at a 10 
suggests that endogeneity is a problem and unemployment mirror those of the percent rate. In this log­linear specifica­
and so only instrumental variable esti­ previous table. Although smoking bans tion, estimated coefficients of ­0.0001 
mation of cumulative effects from exerted negative and weakly significant on funding adequacy at discount rates of 
spending and adequacy are displayed in effects in one instance in the previous 
the following tables. table, it never exerts a significant effect 
S P E N D I N G A N D A D E Q U AC Y 
Table 6 displays estimations of cumula­ cy measures are discounted at 15 and 
tive control spending on cigarette sales 20 percent; it exerted negative effects in 
with four alternative discount rates. all estimations of the previous table. 
Prices and income exert significant and Spending adequacy exerts negative and 
negative effects in all four estimations, significant effects when discounted at 5 
and effects of unemployment and smok­ and 10 percent. No effects are found 
ing bans (except in column 4 where it is when adequacy measures are discount­
weakly significant and negative) cannot ed at 15 and 20 percent. Therefore, there 
be distinguished statistically from zero. is some support for cdc claims con­
Smuggling exerts weakly significant and cerning funding adequacy when this 
negative effects in all estimations. Cumu­ measure is discounted at rates of 5 and 
lative spending measures exert no sig­ 10 percent, but not at rates of 15 and 20 
T a b l e 7 
Effects of cumulative adequacy on cigarette sales with instrumental variable 
for adequacy of spending 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real price per pack (PRICE ) **­0.7956*** **­0.7939*** **­0.7941*** **­0.7965*** 
(9.47) (9.40) (9.34) (9.31) 
**­2.61E­05*** **­2.72E­05*** **­2.82E­05*** **­2.93E­05*** 
(5.03) (5.28) (5.56) (5.86) 
Unemployment (UE ) ­0.0044 ­0.0040 ­0.0034 ­0.0027 
(0.55) (0.50) (0.43) (0.34) 
State­wide smoking 0.0199 ­0.0213 ­0.0227 ­0.0240 
(1.09) (1.16) (1.24) (1.31) 
­0.1933 ­0.2027 ­0.2106* *­0.2163* 
border states’ prices (SMUG ) (1.52) (1.60) (1.66) (1.71) 
Discount Rate 
5% 10% 15% 20% 
Tobacco control spending *­0.0001** *­0.0001* ­0.0001 0.0001 
(2.22) (1.94) (1.64) (1.30) 
minimums (ADEQUACY ) 
Constant ***9.9678*** ***9.9985*** ***10.0418*** ***10.0962*** 
(23.08) (22.98) (22.91) (22.91) 
R­squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Mean dependent variable 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26 
S.E. of regression 0.0824 0.0826 0.0827 0.0829 
F­statistic 138.84 138.37 137.91 137.50 
Observations 400 400 400 400 
in Table 7. Smuggling exerts significant 
and negative effects only when adequa­
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5 and 10 percent can be interpreted as 
unit changes in the cumulative value of 
adequacy associated with a 100 * ­0.0001 
percent change in taxed cigarette sales. 
Taxed sales fall by 0.011 percent for each 
additional unit. Based on average taxed 
sales in 2007 of 68 packs per capita, an 
additional unit rise in ADEQUACY 
would lower annual sales by 0.68 packs 
per capita. This estimate suggests eco­
nomic effects are trivial. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical evidence does not generally 
support the cdc claim that states that 
spend more on tobacco control deter 
more tobacco use than states that spend 
less. Contemporaneous spending on 
tobacco control is never found to exert 
an inverse effect on sales, and at times is 
found to exert a significant and posi­
tive effect on sales, contrary to the claims 
of the cdc. The true effect, however, 
appears to be zero based on current and 
past spending discounted at various 
rates. There is limited support for cdc 
claims regarding its recommendations 
on funding adequacy when this spend­
ing measure is discounted at rates of 5 
and 10 percent, but not at rates of 15 and 
20 percent. When significant, however, 
these effects arise at fairly low levels of 
confidence and with trivial effects on 
cigarette sales, and therefore suggest very 
cautious support for the cdc recom­
mendations concerning adequacy. These 
conclusions are based on a battery of 
tests that consider various measures of 
contemporaneous and past spending 
and adequacy and are conducted over an 
eight­year period in which over $5 billion 
(in 2005 dollars), or roughly $18 per 
capita, was spent on tobacco control. 
This study raises questions about the 
process by which the cdc determines 
its spending recommendations and 
whether the process is designed to reach 
a particular conclusion about tobacco 
control policy rather than to uncover 
policies that may best allocate resources 
toward controlling tobacco use. There 
may be a similarity to what I noted in a 
2008 Econ Journal Watch paper on why 
the cdc and various researchers con­
clude that indoor smoking bans exert 
either positive or no adverse economic 
effects on restaurants and bars when, in 
fact, published studies demonstrate that 
numbers of businesses harmed are not 
zero. Factors include biases by govern­
ments and researchers that favor gov­
ernment solutions to perceived smoking 
problems, ample funding for researchers 
that conclude that bans exert no eco­
nomic harm, simply ignoring industry­
funded research that indicates some 
degree of harm, and tacit agreement 
between many researchers to not open­
ly scrutinize the quality of colleagues’ 
published research on this topic. It 
would be interesting to explore whether 
any of those factors might be influenc­
ing the policy process whereby the cdc 
makes spending recommendations 
regarding tobacco control. Those fac­
tors might also explain why the cdc is 
not compelled to demonstrate the effec­
tiveness of its recommendations. R 
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